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A World Without Norms: Historicizing Critique and 
Postcritique 
_Abstract 
Postcritical methodologies are reluctant to historicize themselves because historiciza-
tion is itself one of the suspicious/symptomatic critical modes that they seek to re-
place. Nevertheless, a proper historicization of the transition from critique to postcri-
tique could lend more legitimacy to postcritique, and would also help us determine if 
its methodological tools are adequate to our contemporary moment. This essay uses 
Michel Foucault’s description of the move from a disciplinary to a governmental re-
gime of power to historicize the transition from critique to postcritique. Focusing in 
particular on the function and power of norms under disciplinarity and governmental-
ity, I argue that our commitment to critique should be determined by the relative nor-
mativity of contemporary society.  
 
In May 2019, I attended and spoke at a conference — “Reading in the Age of Trump: 
The Politics and Possibility of Literary Studies Now” — hosted by Johannes Gutenberg 
University in Mainz, Germany. As the organizers explain, the conference aimed to “his-
toricize the past two decades in literary criticism in order to examine its present politics 
and future possibility.”1 Over the course of three days, the conference participants iden-
tified many of the twenty-first century’s literary-critical commitments — autonomy, 
sociology, ecology, form — but by far the most discussed was postcritique, a method-
ological turn away from symptomatic reading and a “hermeneutics of suspicion” that 
reimagines interpretation as “a coproduction between actors that brings new things to 
light rather than an endless rumination on a text’s hidden meanings or representational 
failures.”2 Displaying little patience for this postcritical turn, conference participants 
were in near unanimous agreement that the notion of critique one finds in Rita Felski’s 
The Limits of Critique, or in Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus’s “Surface Reading” 
essay, is a reductive caricature. What scholar today actually “ruminates on a text’s hid-
den meaning or representational failures”? And when it comes to our contemporary 
“Age of Trump,” many argued that we need critique now more than ever. 
I absolutely agree that much scholarship in a postcritical vein grossly mischaracter-
izes critical reading practices to make postcritique appear more significant than it ac-
tually is. In the spirit of the conference’s desire to historicize today’s critical reading 
practices, however, I also think postcritique should be taken seriously. There are spe-
cific historical/material reasons that postcritical reading practices (e.g., surface, distant, 
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reparative, and machine reading), accompanied by a scholarly interest in new objects 
of analysis (e.g., affect, things, animacy, embodiment, and networks), have grown more 
dominant in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Although you wouldn’t 
know it from reading Felski, who admits that her work offers “neither a philosophical 
meditation [on] nor a historical explanation [of]” critique and its limits,3 these method-
ological shifts aren’t just faddish trends pursued willy-nilly by fashionable academic 
whim.4 Rather, they are deliberate intellectual responses to material changes in the so-
cio-political landscape of our time. Bruno Latour recognizes this a bit more than Felski 
does. Although he too directs a good deal of snark toward the heroic affect of fashion-
able critics, Latour also observes that “things have changed a lot”5 since the twentieth 
century when critique was a more powerful intellectual tool. In particular, although he 
doesn’t fully explain why or how it happened, Latour worries that critique has grown 
politically impotent now that right-wing conspiracy theorists deploy it as effectively as 
university intellectuals.6 Best and Marcus offer even more historicizing context, noting 
that major political events of the early twenty-first century — torture at Abu Ghraib, 
the racial disparities revealed by Hurricane Katrina, and the botched, pretextual Iraq 
war — were unfolding so transparently that critique no longer provided the best tools 
for analysis and understanding.7  
As these gestures toward historicization suggest, the contemporary turn away from 
critique can be read as a symptom of the contemporary itself. But because postcritical 
work tends to view historicization as an instance of symptomatization — that is, as a 
suspicious, critical move par excellence — it doesn’t do a particularly good job ex-
plaining and justifying its own reason for being. Rather than justifying the move from 
critique to postcritique by pointing to specific historical events like Abu Ghraib, Hur-
ricane Katrina, or 9/11 that were perhaps immune to critique in very particular ways, 
I’d argue instead that a changing relationship to norms, both individual and social, pro-
vides a better historical context for explaining the emergence of postcritical thought.8 
Critique remains a powerful tool in a world governed by norms, but it’s much less 
useful in a post-normative world where norms have little purchase. Thus, one way to 
decide if we should be critical or postcritical involves determining whether we are liv-
ing in a normative or post-normative world, (keeping in mind that this isn’t a mutually 
exclusive choice). 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 7 (2019): Critique 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2019/14765/ 
4 
Foucault’s work, particularly his writings and lectures from the late 1970s onward, 
is quite helpful for thinking about the relative normativity of contemporary society and, 
in turn, for historicizing the move from critique to postcritique. As is well known, the 
functioning of norms is foundational to Foucault’s thinking about the deployment of 
biopower in a disciplinary society. Famously, Foucault identifies a shift from laws to 
norms as a defining feature of the transition from sovereign power (a negative, juridico-
discursive form of power guaranteed by the sovereign’s “right to take life or let live”) 
to disciplinary biopower (a regulative, institutional form of power “bent on generating 
forces, making them grow, and ordering them”).9 Arguing that “[a] normalizing society 
is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life,” Foucault explains 
that disciplinary biopower privileges “the action of the norm at the expense of the ju-
ridical system of the law.” The law doesn’t disappear, but as “the judicial institution is 
increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses […] whose functions are for 
the most part regulatory,” it does “operate more and more as a norm.”10  
According to Foucault, however, normative disciplinary power was no longer his 
contemporary moment’s dominant form of power. Instead, in a series of lectures from 
the late 1970s,11 he contends that governmentality, which he describes elsewhere as 
“the conduct of conducts,”12 represents a new modality of power that takes “pre-emi-
nence over all other types of power — sovereignty, discipline, and so on.”13 In turn, 
Foucault suggests that norms function quite differently in a governmental regime than 
they do in a disciplinary one. To explain the difference, Foucault first establishes that 
“[d]isciplinary normalization consists […] in positing a model, an optimal model that 
is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the operation of disciplinary normaliza-
tion consists in trying to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this model, 
the normal being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that 
which is incapable of conforming to the norm.” In an effort to emphasize the primacy 
of the norm in this scenario, Foucault suggests that we use the regretfully “barbaric 
word” “normation,” not “normalization.”14 Next, to explore whether norms function 
the same way under governmentality, Foucault imagines a hypothetical smallpox epi-
demic, which the state manages according to a “calculus of probabilities” that statisti-
cally quantifies infection risk for different segments of the population and vaccinates 
accordingly. In other words, the state mathematically determines the “normal” infection 
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rate for the population and then mobilizes to align the infection rate for at-risk popula-
tions with the normal rate. Rather than starting with the norm — the healthy body — 
and then working to turn abnormal/unhealthy bodies into normal/healthy ones, govern-
mentality “takes all who are sick and all who are not as a whole,” using that whole to 
establish the “normal” rate of infection, morbidity, and mortality.15 Under a govern-
mental regime, the state no longer disciplines subjects to a norm of health. Instead, it 
works to secure a normal rate of infection across the totality of the population. Thus, 
Foucault concludes, governmentality is “a system that is […] exactly the opposite of 
the one we have seen with the disciplines.” In this new, governmental mode, “The nor-
mal comes first and the norm is deduced from it.” This process, according to Foucault, 
deserves the name “normalization” since the normal, not the norm, is primary.16  
Norms deduced from the normal resist critique. If governmentality derives the nor-
mal from the statistical measurement of reality, then unless the math is wrong, the nor-
mal is always right. The normal names the statistical average of the world as it is. That’s 
why Foucault also describes the normal as “natural.”17 Although he puts that word in 
quotation marks, letting us know that he knows that the normal isn’t natural in any 
timelessly universal way, it’s also clear that a population governed by the normal lacks 
much ground for critique. Nothing is imposed on them. They aren’t being lied to. Their 
norms can’t be contested. Simply put, there is no better way to be when every way to 
be counts as natural, when every being is included in the normal. Foucault aptly de-
scribes this as the “self-cancellation of phenomena by the phenomena themselves.”18 
But how accurately do these ideas describe society today? Has normativity been 
reduced to a normalcy that simply includes everything in it, or do norms continue to 
shape processes of subjectivation and socialization? Has the ground of critique dis-
solved along with normativity, or do we still have the capacity to articulate the good, 
the better, and the right? The answers to such questions aren’t clear cut. Indeed, just 
moments before suggesting that governmentality takes “pre-eminence over all other 
types of power,” Foucault muddies the waters by insisting that “[w]e should not see 
things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then 
of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government.”19 Thus, Foucault offers us 
two very different historicizations of contemporary power. The first is a developmental 
model, with sovereign power acceding to disciplinary power which in turn accedes to 
governmental control. The second approach implies a simultaneous model in which 
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multiple modes of power remain operative at the same time, perhaps even within the 
same sphere of influence.20 This ambiguity in Foucault’s thinking about the contempo-
rary relationship among sovereign, disciplinary, and governmental power creates a cor-
ollary ambiguity in our understanding of contemporary normativity, which in turn com-
plicates any attempt to determine the relative utility of critical and postcritical methods. 
In other words, if we occupy a moment of governmental dominance, then norms and 
critique are weak. Conversely, if multiple modes of social control are functioning all at 
once, then norms and critique are sometimes potent, sometimes not.  
This ambiguity also explains why, for example, two scholars such as Wendy Brown 
and Eva Cherniavsky, both of whom follow Foucault in understanding neoliberalism 
as “a governing rationality extending a specific formulation of economic values, prac-
tices, and metrics to every dimension of human life,”21 can disagree so dramatically 
about the relevance of norms for contemporary political analysis. In her examination 
of contemporary neoliberalism, Brown acknowledges the impotence of norms in a con-
temporary moment defined by neoliberalism’s normal/natural logic of cost effective-
ness, market efficiency, and best practices. And yet, even though the world might seem 
post-normative, Brown doesn’t abandon norms entirely. For her, neoliberal governance 
“downplays to the point of disavowing […] normative conflicts over the good,” “elim-
inates from discussion politically, ethically, or other-wise normatively inflected dimen-
sions of policy,” and “buries contestable norms and structural striations (such as class), 
as well as the norms and exclusions circulated by its procedures and decisions,” but it’s 
not fully non-normative.22  
 For Cherniavsky, however, Brown is wrong to continue treating neoliberalism as “a 
normative enterprise.”23 Hewing more closely to Foucault’s distinction between the 
norm and the normal, Cherniavsky argues that neoliberal values “have no normative 
social referent.” “[N]eoliberalism […] dissolves the very concept of the norm, of the 
disciplinary measure to which the ensemble of social agents and institutions adheres. 
Implementing control without discipline, neoliberalism cedes to a disincorporated ‘us’ 
the task of deciding in what domain […] we tally up the cost and benefits, reap the 
fruits of our ‘good choices,’ or the burden of our bad ones. The capacity to construct 
the environment in which we reckon our gains and losses is now the mark of social 
agency.”24 Cherniavsky’s post-normative take on neoliberalism grants it no normative 
grounding whatsoever. We don’t just decide what counts as good and bad, a gain or a 
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loss, we also decide the parameters by which we decide. The goalposts aren’t just mo-
bile, they’re virtual. For Brown, normative political culture is erased but recoverable, 
but for Cherniavsky, it has disappeared and isn’t coming back. 
This debate about the role of norms in our contemporary moment matters a great 
deal for anyone interested in figuring out, as Lenin once asked, “What is to be done?” 
It seems to me that we have at least two different options. First, we could fight more 
aggressively, and deliberately, for the reinstatement of norms. For example, we might 
reinforce already-existing normative institutions, implement stricter normative expec-
tations on normatively weak environments like the internet, or the Trump administra-
tion, and/or develop more severe forms of accountability for norm violators. The very 
public critiques of speech and behavior that have emerged from recent social justice 
movements, for instance, are a good example of normatively motivated political tactics. 
Given her attachment to a normative vision of neoliberal governance, one might expect 
Brown to endorse something similar, but in the conclusion to Undoing the Demos, she 
forthrightly acknowledges the failures of normative critique in our current conjuncture: 
“The neoliberal economization of the political […] divests the terms of liberal demo-
cratic justice of their capacity to contest or to limit the reach of market values and 
distributions into every quarter of life.” The “platform of critique” is unavailable to us, 
she suggests.25 And at the end of an even more recent essay that reads contemporary 
forms of authoritarianism as an unsurprising outgrowth of neoliberal governmentality, 
Brown dishearteningly concludes that:  
the aggrieved, reactive creature fashioned by neoliberal reason and its effects […] 
cannot be appealed to by reason, facts, or sustained argument because it does not 
want to know, and it is unmotivated by consistency or depth in its values or by 
belief in truth […]. It cannot be wooed by a viable alternative future, where it sees 
no place for itself, no prospect for restoring its lost supremacy […]. Having noth-
ing to lose, its nihilism does not simply negate but is festive and even apocalyptic, 
willing to take Britain over a cliff, deny climate change, support manifestly un-
democratic powers, or put an unstable know-nothing in the most powerful position 
on earth, because it has nothing else. It probably cannot be reached or transformed 
yet also has no endgame.26 
For Brown, the authoritarian turn in neoliberal governmentality produces plenty of des-
pair and little hope for critique.27  
A second possibility, if a return to normativity and critique is too much to hope for, 
might explore other political possibilities, besides authoritarianism, that post-norma-
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tivity makes available. To be sure, as Brown correctly worries, post-normativity under-
mines liberal democracy’s ostensible commitment to a shared, inclusive vision of 
equality, freedom, and justice, and might even lead to authoritarianism. However, just 
because post-normativity isn’t uniquely (i.e. normatively) committed to equality, free-
dom, and justice, doesn’t mean that it can’t produce those outcomes. Cherniavsky, for 
example, pursues the political possibilities of post-normativity through the concept of 
“neocitizenship.” Observing the erosion of “the terrain on which we have historically 
understood the ‘citizen’ to operate,” she suggests that normative political culture has 
been replaced with “serial culture,” which, “unlike normative culture […] does not dif-
ferentiate among identities (between the normal and the pathological, for example), so 
much as cultivate a process of differentiation that produces an ever broader spectrum 
of identities” disaggregated from the collective, normative project of liberal democ-
racy.28 But how exactly might politics proceed under these serial conditions? How can 
we articulate notions of equality, freedom, or justice without normative consensus?  
These challenging questions lack a single, satisfactory answer, but one possible take 
on post-normative politics comes from Foucault himself. In a lecture titled “What is 
Critique?,” Foucault argues that western modernity’s pervasive “critical attitude” — “a 
certain way of thinking, speaking and acting, a certain relationship to what exists, to 
what one knows, to what one does, a relationship to society, to culture and also a rela-
tionship to others” — gradually emerges as a response to the changing experience of 
being governed. Thus, Foucault defines critique as “the art of not being governed quite 
so much.”29 Notably, Foucault’s definition of critique offers no ideal form of govern-
ance. There isn’t a normative standard against which one might evaluate its current 
modality. There isn’t a better way to govern, or a right way to govern. Instead, there 
are only different ways to govern, which emerge at different historical moments out of 
the reciprocal interaction between power and knowledge. Consequently, critique as 
Foucault understands it does not make normative arguments about “what is true or 
false, founded or unfounded, real or illusory, scientific or ideological, legitimate or 
abusive.”30 Instead, in the spirit of Immanuel Kant’s critical project, critique for Fou-
cault discerns the conditions of possibility that limit but also make knowledge possible 
in a given historical context. Unsurprisingly, the best tools for such a project, Foucault 
suggests, are the ones he’s been deploying his entire career: archaeology and geneal-
ogy, two methodologies which, no matter how intractable and deeply rooted our current 
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conjuncture, allow us to imagine its possible “disappearance” and replacement.31 This 
“critical ontology of ourselves,” Foucault suggests elsewhere, “has to be conceived as 
an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one 
and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an 
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”32 
Of course, it’s easy to experiment with the possibility of going beyond the limits 
that sovereign laws or disciplinary norms impose upon us. They are impositions, nor-
mative interventions, and genealogical analyses that diagnose their conditions of pos-
sibility and make resistance discernible and executable. That’s why, to the extent that 
sovereign and disciplinary regimes of power continue to operate, there will always be 
a place for oppositional, normative critique. But what do such experiments look like 
under a regime of neoliberal governmentality in which there are, to be sure, still limits, 
but limits that aren’t necessarily impositions because they’re normal and natural? What 
do we do when this descriptive, genealogical mode of critique mirrors the serial culture 
of neoliberal governmentality itself? How do we cultivate the “art of not being gov-
erned quite so much” when the normalcy of governance is equivalent to the natural 
world? Are there post-normative ways of being that might reconfigure the natural nor-
malcy of post-normative governance, or are we just trapped in perpetual immanence?33 
By way of conclusion, I offer one possible answer to these questions in the form of 
Paul Beatty’s 2015 novel The Sellout, a “critical ontology of ourselves” deeply invested 
in “not being governed quite so much,” and, to my mind, evidence that a world without 
norms can potentially produce non-authoritarian outcomes.34 Throughout the novel, 
Beatty conjures a world that violates every possible norm — equality, freedom, justice 
— that western liberalism holds inviolable. The eponymous “sellout,” a black man 
nicknamed Bonbon, doesn’t just listen to the wrong music, play the wrong sports, eat 
the wrong food, laugh at the wrong jokes, and pursue the wrong politics. He betrays 
his race, his nation, and its liberal democracy by enslaving an elderly black neighbor, 
Hominy, and segregating the public transportation and local schools in Dickens, a fic-
tional, largely black and Mexican community, in Los Angeles, California. Bonbon 
doesn’t just transgress his community’s racial norms; he breaks his nation’s racial laws. 
Thus, at the novel’s conclusion, Bonbon awaits the Supreme Court’s verdict on charges 
that he has violated the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Con-
stitution. 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 7 (2019): Critique 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2019/14765/ 
10 
The charges are serious — selling out liberal democracy could prove criminal — 
but The Sellout is also quite funny. Bonbon’s enslavement of Hominy isn’t cruel and 
vicious. Rather, Hominy masochistically asks Bonbon if he can be his slave. He enjoys 
it. And the schools are only “segregated” because Bonbon has erected fake signs on a 
vacant lot announcing that a new, whites-only “Wheaton Academy Charter Magnet 
School of the Arts, Science, Humanities, Business, Fashion, and Everything Else” will 
soon be built across the street from Dickens’ grossly underfunded Chaff Middle School, 
which, like so many public schools today, is already de facto segregated anyway.35 
Playing on “the colored person’s desire for the domineering white presence, which the 
Wheaton Academy represented,” and exemplifying what Cherniavsky describes as “the 
capacity to construct the environment in which we reckon our gains and losses,” Bon-
bon’s efforts at school segregation immediately raise test scores, employment, housing 
prices, and graduation rates in Dickens.36 Thus, the “legal quandary” the Supreme 
Court must decide: “whether a violation of civil rights law that results in the very same 
achievement these heretofore mentioned statutes were meant to promote, yet have 
failed to achieve, is in fact a breach of said civil rights.”37 If slavery and segregation 
make life in Dickens more equal, free, and just — not to mention more fun, enjoyable, 
and community oriented — then are they still wrong? Are they still normative? 
This is funny, but Beatty isn’t joking. He isn’t pro-slavery and pro-segregation, but 
he’s also not anti-slavery and anti-segregation either. That’s because Beatty isn’t par-
ticularly interested in what slavery and segregation mean, whether they’re right or 
wrong, or their legal and/or normative function in contemporary society. Instead, he’s 
interested in the new worlds one might build out of them once they’ve been detached 
from the laws and norms that typically ground their significance in the world. Slavery 
and segregation might not mean anything in particular for Beatty, but instead of wal-
lowing in the post-normative nihilism that Brown ascribes to “the aggrieved, reactive 
creature fashioned by neoliberal reason and its effects,” Beatty, and his protagonist 
Bonbon, exploit post-normativity to build an entirely different world — a world that 
achieves equality, freedom, and justice by abandoning liberal democracy’s normative 
commitment to equality, freedom, and justice.  
Many critics have chosen to read this as satire. “Swiftian satire of the highest order,” 
the book’s back cover reads. The Sellout can only function as satire, however, if it 
shares its readers’ liberal racial norms, which it doesn’t. As the Cambridge introduction 
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to satire explains in its opening definition of the genre: “What distinguishes satire from 
other kinds of writing […] is the moral purpose of the satirist — the desire to ‘mend 
the world.’” 38 But Beatty doesn’t offer a satirical version of the world in the hopes of 
correcting and improving it. He isn’t critiquing a nation’s hypocrisy or demanding that 
liberal democracy honor its legal and normative commitments. He has no normative 
sense of what a “better” world might look like. Instead, he’s imagining the possibilities, 
and liabilities, afforded by a world that abandons those normative commitments — 
because from Beatty’s perspective, that’s the post-normative world in which African-
Americans already live.  
Consequently, whenever anyone describes his work as satire, Beatty just laughs un-
comfortably and claims not to know what the word means. When Marc Maron asks 
him about his understanding of satire, for example, Beatty responds, “I don’t know, 
man. It’s just these words that people hide behind. Because you get to say, ‘Oh some-
thing’s satirical,’ and you don’t have to […] what does that mean? You know, it’s like, 
what are we satirizing? Am I being satirized? It’s a good deflecting word.”39 And when 
Jeffrey Brown of PBS NewsHour asks Beatty if “this kind of big satire [is] hard to pull 
off?” Beatty asserts, “Uh, yeah, I don’t try to be satirical. I just try to get what’s in my 
head on the page.”40 Or, in response to an audience inquiry after a reading at a Wash-
ington D.C. bookstore, Beatty explains that “somebody was talking about the book, 
and, you know, everyone’s saying, ‘Satire.’ And my friend’s friend said, ‘No, it’s not 
satire, it’s reportage. This shit’s all true,’ you know what I mean?”41 
If this is the post-normative world we already live in — a world in which racial 
inequality and injustice, segregation and slavery are all perfectly normal and natural — 
then why pretend that the liberal democratic laws and norms developed to counteract 
those violent inequities can actually do their job? Or, as Beatty explains in response to 
Jeffrey Brown’s question, “What do we get wrong?”: “We get it all wrong,” Beatty 
says. “There’s no right. And I think that’s part of it, is that, like, we think that there’s 
this weird, you know, utopian endgame to life, you know. Not just racial politics. And 
for me it’s a weird way to try to live life.”42 Rather than satirically reinforcing a nor-
mative vision of justice that can govern better, Beatty uses his post-normative vision to 
speculatively craft alternative social relations and develop new modes of being dedi-
cated to the “art of not being governed quite so much” — not just in The Sellout, but in 
White Boy Shuffle (1996), Tuff (2000), and Slumberland (2008) as well. Beatty’s work 
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demonstrates how the “affirmation of nothing” can still be affirming43 — how, in lieu 
of post-normative despair, we might instead affirm the obsolescence of laws and norms 
that never really delivered on their promise in the first place. 
Reading The Sellout as critique in the Foucauldian sense — that is, as a “historical 
analysis of the limits that are imposed on us” (liberal democracy) and as “an experiment 
with the possibility of going beyond them” (an Afro-pessimism that refuses to exclude 
exclusion) — demonstrates that critique need not always function normatively. There 
are forms of critique that can produce a vision of justice even as they deny the norma-
tive grounding of justice itself. Felski misses this point when she insists that Foucauld-
ian critique, despite its disinterest in “forcefully extract[ing] a deep but disavowed 
truth,” nevertheless remains deeply suspicious, an apt example of the “hermeneutics of 
suspicion” that her work challenges.44 But to believe that things are the way they are 
for a reason, and even to believe that things can be otherwise, doesn’t require suspicion 
or a commitment to normative critique. Instead, all it requires is curiosity and a will-
ingness to recognize that something new (although not necessarily something better) 
lies on the other side of thought’s normative limits. 
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